Who Is Really Responsible? — Democracy, Accountability and the Limits of National Sovereignty

 

Public power is no longer exercised mainly within the boundaries of the Dutch state. Legislation, economic policy, digital regulation, migration, climate action, public health, security and judicial protection are increasingly shaped through the European Union, international organizations, treaties and cross-border regulatory networks. The Netherlands does not simply surrender authority in these arrangements; it exercises power jointly with other states and institutions to address problems that no country can manage effectively on its own.

Shared authority creates a chain of responsibility rather than a disappearance of responsibility⁷⁵⁴. Dutch institutions help shape mandates, negotiating positions, compromises, implementation choices, and enforcement. Constitutional accountability should therefore identify what was decided at each stage, which actor possessed influence, which constraints were binding, and which national choices remained. The object is traceability, not the fiction of complete national control.

This multilevel system can expand democratic capacity. European and international cooperation enables states to regulate financial markets, digital platforms, product chains, emissions, data flows and security threats that transcend national borders. At the same time, it makes responsibility harder to identify. Citizens may not know which choices were prescribed internationally, which resulted from negotiations and which remained available to Dutch institutions during implementation.

European decision-making should consequently be understood partly as domestic government. Dutch ministers do not merely receive European rules from outside: they participate in creating them⁷⁵⁵. Important compromises may already be formed in working groups and negotiations before a proposal reaches a public ministerial meeting. Presenting the eventual outcome simply as something imposed by “Brussels” conceals the Netherlands’ own role, even though no single member state controls the final result.

The central problem is that parliamentary scrutiny often occurs too late⁷⁵⁶. Government has earlier and more extensive access to negotiating documents, expertise and European networks. By the time Parliament discusses a proposal, the Dutch position may already be established or the international compromise may be difficult to change. Approval after negotiations therefore does not necessarily amount to meaningful democratic influence.

Enhanced prior scrutiny should be triggered when a proposal materially affects fundamental rights, constitutional institutions, major public expenditure or revenue, the transfer of public powers, long-term policy discretion, or the position of decentralized or Kingdom authorities⁷⁵⁷.

Routine technical matters may remain subject to ordinary information duties. Government should explain briefly when it concludes that a dossier falls below the enhanced threshold⁷⁵⁸.

Treaty negotiations create a similar imbalance. Government negotiates the final text, while Parliament usually receives a result it can accept or reject but not amend. Provisional application, simplified amendment procedures and politically influential agreements that are not formally classified as treaties can further reduce effective scrutiny. International commitments may thus acquire practical force before their constitutional, financial or societal consequences have been fully debated.

A stronger constitutional framework would require early parliamentary information and involvement in matters that substantially affect fundamental rights, public finances, national policy space or the distribution of public powers. Parliament should be able to influence the general direction of the Dutch negotiating position before essential choices become irreversible. Government would retain the flexibility needed to negotiate and compromise, but it would have to explain how it used that freedom and why it departed from previously discussed positions.

A multilevel accountability record should follow four stages⁷⁵⁹. Before negotiations, government identifies objectives, alternatives, legal bases, red lines, affected interests, and expected decision points. During negotiations, it provides proportionate updates when material choices change.

During implementation, it distinguishes binding external requirements from national discretion and identifies the authority responsible for each choice. Afterwards, it reports the position taken, the compromise reached, deviations from the prior mandate, implementation outcomes, and any need for revision⁷⁶⁰.

Confidentiality may protect diplomacy, security, privacy, or market-sensitive negotiations, but it should modify the form of scrutiny rather than eliminate it⁷⁶¹. A defined parliamentary body should receive timely access under secure conditions, restrictions should identify their legal basis and duration, and withheld material should be reviewed for later disclosure. Government should not use a general claim of negotiating sensitivity when the substance is already known to other governments, lobbyists, or market actors.

Subsidiarity should guide the choice of decision-making level⁷⁶². It does not create an automatic preference for national or local government. Cross-border problems may require European or international regulation because separate national action would be ineffective or allow governments and companies to shift costs elsewhere. Other matters may need national, regional or local differentiation. The relevant question is which level combines effectiveness, democratic legitimacy, proportionality and protection of fundamental rights.

 

Decentralized authorities should participate when European or international proposals significantly affect their tasks, finances or capacity. Municipalities, provinces and water authorities often implement rules negotiated elsewhere and may possess practical knowledge that central government lacks. Their early involvement can improve feasibility and expose territorial or cumulative consequences before national positions become fixed⁷⁶³.

The same applies within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Foreign relations may be organized at Kingdom level, but international decisions can affect the autonomous responsibilities and distinct interests of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Their involvement must provide genuine influence rather than late formal consultation. Caribbean Netherlands also requires specific attention because its position and relationship with the European Union differ from those of the European Netherlands.

The proposed framework must respect the primacy, autonomy, and uniform application of EU law within the fields of Union competence. National constitutional identity under Article 4(2) TEU is a principle to be argued through European legal dialogue, not a unilateral license to disapply inconvenient obligations⁷⁶⁴. Dutch institutions nevertheless remain responsible for the positions they support, new powers they approve, national discretion they exercise, and rights safeguards they seek within EU procedures.

National constitutional responsibility nevertheless remains meaningful. Dutch institutions must decide whether to support new transfers or forms of shared authority, how to participate in European decisions and how to use the policy discretion left by international rules. They should protect democracy, human dignity, fundamental rights, judicial independence and effective legal remedies throughout those processes. Tensions should be addressed through legal dialogue and cooperation rather than unilateral withdrawal from shared obligations.

International power is also exercised outside formal public institutions. Private standard-setting⁷⁶⁵ organizations, financial institutions, technology companies and professional networks can develop rules that become practically binding through procurement, market access or technical dependence. Constitutional scrutiny should therefore consider the real effects of international instruments and standards rather than relying exclusively on their formal names.

For Parliament, the reform would require better institutional capacity⁷⁶⁶. Timely influence is impossible without specialized staff, independent advice, access to documents and continuous monitoring of fast-moving negotiations. An annual overview of important European and international dossiers could help Parliament concentrate on matters with the greatest constitutional or societal impact. Additional information without sufficient analytical capacity would merely increase paperwork.

For citizens, the main benefit would be clearer democratic responsibility. Public explanations should distinguish what Europe or an international agreement actually requires from choices made by the Dutch government itself. This would make it more difficult for national authorities to attribute unpopular domestic decisions to external obligations when meaningful national discretion remained.

Every major implementing measure should contain a short responsibility statement: which provisions are required by EU or international law; which choices are optional; which Dutch institution selected those options; and what alternatives were considered. If European law sets a minimum objective while leaving Member States choices about enforcement, procedure, exemptions, or financing, the national explanation should separate the common obligation from each domestic option selected. It should also identify which institution negotiated the European position, how Parliament and decentralized authorities were involved, which alternatives remained lawful, and where a person can challenge implementation. This prevents both unjustified blame-shifting and the opposite error of ignoring binding supranational constraints. This statement would not simplify every legal interaction, but it would reduce strategic blame-shifting and make domestic political responsibility easier to examine.

The principal risks are bureaucracy, slower negotiations and excessive parliamentary involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. Unclear thresholds could generate disputes over which matters require enhanced scrutiny, while repeated national procedures might reduce Dutch influence if negotiators cannot respond flexibly. These risks support a differentiated approach: general information duties for ordinary matters, stronger prior involvement for decisions with major constitutional or financial consequences, and later accountability when genuine urgency prevents consultation.

The overall objective is not to restore a closed model of national sovereignty. It is to create democratic infrastructure for a world in which authority is necessarily shared. European and international cooperation should remain possible and effective, but Dutch participation must be transparent, constitutionally responsible and open to correction. The decisive question is not whether power is national or international, but whether the chosen level protects rights, permits meaningful democratic control and makes responsibility for decisions recognizable.

 

 

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726  Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,’ International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 1–31; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration.

727  Treaty on European Union, arts. 10, 12, and 16; Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European

Union,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E/PRO/01

728  Deirdre Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Tapio Raunio, ‘National Parliaments and European Integration,’ in The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

729  Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, 2018); OECD, Government at a Glance 2025, while distinguishing social return from automatic fiscal return.

759   Protocol No. 2, art. 2, on regional and local dimensions; European Charter of Local Self- Government, arts. 4 and 9.

760  Treaty on European Union, art. 4(2); Court of Justice of the European Union, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case 11/70, EU:C:1970:114; Melloni, C-399/11, EU:C:2013:107; Taricco II, C-42/17, EU:C:2017:936.

761  Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, and Jan Wouters, eds., Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,’ International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456.

762  OECD, OECD Best Practices for Parliaments in Budgeting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019); European Parliamentary Research Service materials on national parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs.

763  Christopher Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Mark Bovens, Deirdre Curtin, and Paul ’t Hart, eds., The Real World of EU Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

764  European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2021) 305 final; Treaty on European Union, art. 10, on

democratic representation and accountability

765  European Court of Human Rights, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, App. No. 37374/05, Judgment of 14 April 2009; Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, CETS No. 205.

766  Treaty on European Union, art. 5; Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E/PRO/02.