Who is responsible when a problem crosses borders?

 

Scale-Consistent Governance in an Interdependent World

Many contemporary challenges, including climate change, migration, financial instability, pandemics, digital infrastructure and geopolitical security, develop simultaneously across local, national, regional and global levels. Political and legal institutions, however, remain largely organized around territorial states and fixed administrative boundaries. This creates a structural mismatch[1] between the scale of social problems and the scale at which decisions are made.

The central design problem is to allocate authority at the scale where a function can be performed effectively while keeping responsibility visible to the people affected. Causes, effects, finance, expertise, implementation, and legal remedies often occur at different levels. Assigning the whole problem to one level creates either incapacity or remoteness. Scale-consistent governance therefore distributes functions across levels and requires citizens to be able to trace who proposed, funded, implemented, supervised, reviewed, and can correct each decision.

The local level offers proximity, contextual knowledge and implementation capacity. National institutions remain central to democratic representation, legislation and constitutional accountability. Regional bodies can coordinate policies and harmonize standards across states, while global institutions are needed to address collective-action and systemic problems[2]. Difficulties arise when responsibilities are distributed across these levels without clear mandates or effective coordination.

Scale mismatch is reinforced by several forms of fragmentation. Economic, ecological, technological and social processes are functionally interconnected, while institutions continue to operate through separate policy sectors. Authority is vertically divided among administrative levels and horizontally divided among departments with different objectives. Legal mandates remain territorially restricted even when the relevant problems cross borders. Policies may consequently overlap, contradict one another or leave important gaps, while authorities can avoid responsibility by referring problems to other institutions.

These failures reduce policy effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. National measures may have little influence over transnational systems, while decisions increasingly shaped at supranational levels remain distant from the institutions through which citizens traditionally exercise control. When public governance cannot operate at the appropriate scale, power may shift towards multinational corporations, financial markets, digital platforms or technocratic networks that lack equivalent democratic accountability. Institutional correctability is then weakened because neither responsibility nor the appropriate level for intervention is clear.

The appropriate response is not universal centralization or unrestricted decentralization, but functionally complementary, multilevel governance. Responsibilities should be assigned according to the scale and nature of each problem. Subsidiarity requires decisions to remain at the lowest level capable of addressing them effectively, while higher levels intervene when coordination or collective action exceeds local or national capacity. Complementarity means that these levels support and correct one another rather than operate as rivals[3].

A scale-consistency assessment[4] should ask: Where do the principal causes and effects occur? Which level can act effectively without exporting serious costs? What local knowledge would be lost through centralization? What coordination failure would persist through decentralization? Which public can authorize and contest the decision? And how will responsibility, review, funding, and implementation be connected across levels?

Supranational institutions should therefore be strengthened selectively[5]. Climate policy, financial regulation and digital infrastructure require substantial cross-border coordination, whereas education, social security and other context-sensitive domains may remain primarily national or local. Supranational authority needs clearly defined, domain-specific mandates rather than a general expansion of centralized power. It must also be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, independent review, public deliberation and transparent accountability.

Local implementation remains indispensable even when goals are established at higher levels. Cities, regions and communities possess knowledge that distant institutions cannot fully capture. General standards should therefore leave room for experimentation and context-specific adaptation. Successful local approaches can be expanded, while ineffective measures can be revised or discontinued[6]. This combination of common objectives and local variation creates shorter feedback loops and supports continuous institutional learning.

Multilevel systems require strong connective infrastructure. Structured cooperation among governments, shared databases, interoperable digital systems and cross-sector networks can improve coordination and policy coherence. Hybrid institutions[7] involving public authorities, researchers, civil society and private actors can combine diverse knowledge and resources. Such cooperation must nevertheless preserve clear responsibility, privacy, transparency and public accountability. Otherwise, networks may blur rather than clarify who is answerable for decisions.

For every major multilevel program, a public responsibility map should identify the rule-setting authority, funding body, implementing institution, data controller, supervisory body, complaint forum, reviewing court, and politically accountable representative[8]. Joint action does not justify joint anonymity: each participant should disclose its contribution and the limits of its authority.

Democratic legitimacy must be protected at every relevant scale. Supranational parliaments, stronger involvement of national legislatures and institutional links between representative bodies can extend democratic control beyond the state. Citizen assemblies, transnational forums, consultation and participatory policymaking can complement representation by incorporating public experience into complex decisions. Digital participation may reduce geographical barriers, but it requires safeguards for inclusion, privacy, information quality and protection against manipulation.

Polycentric governance offers an adaptable institutional model. Instead of placing authority in a single center, it distributes decision-making among multiple partly autonomous institutions that cooperate, experiment and correct one another. Issue-based institutions can be organized around the functional scale of particular problems rather than inherited territorial boundaries[9]. Dynamic allocation of authority can allow responsibilities to move when the nature, urgency or reach of a problem changes[10].

Any movement of authority should be governed by prior legal criteria, a stated duration and purpose, representative authorization, publication of reasons, preservation of rights and remedies, and scheduled review. Emergency reallocation should expire unless renewed through the ordinary constitutional process. Such flexibility must remain legally bound and democratically supervised.

Multilevel governance nevertheless produces unavoidable tensions. Shared decision-making can appear to weaken national sovereignty, even when it increases the practical ability to govern cross-border problems. Sovereignty should therefore be understood as a shared and functional capacity rather than exclusive territorial control. States do not simply surrender authority; they allocate particular powers to the level at which those powers can be exercised effectively, while retaining influence through joint procedures and national parliamentary oversight.

Institutional complexity creates another tension. The differentiation needed to govern complex systems can make decision-making difficult for citizens to understand. Overlapping procedures may obscure where decisions are made, who is responsible and how outcomes can be challenged. Clear mandates, accessible communication, transparent procedures and visible accountability are therefore essential. Complexity cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be organized so that citizens and representatives can navigate and scrutinize it.

Coordination also consumes time, expertise and resources. Too little coordination produces fragmentation, while excessive consultation can result in bureaucratic delay. Clear divisions of responsibility, standardized procedures, interoperable systems, carefully designed digital infrastructure and the removal of unnecessary administrative layers can make complexity more manageable. The goal is not institutional simplicity at any cost, but sufficient coordination without paralysis.

Regions and states also differ greatly in wealth, administrative capacity, technology and geopolitical influence[11]. Without corrective arrangements, stronger actors may dominate collective decisions while weaker ones lack the capacity to implement common policies. Capacity-building, financial solidarity, redistribution, inclusive voting procedures and transparent participation rules[12] can mitigate these inequalities. Complete equality is impossible, but structural asymmetries should not prevent meaningful participation or create persistent blind spots.

Institutional inertia further complicates reform. Existing legal frameworks, bureaucratic routines and vested interests provide stability but can prevent governance from adapting to changing problems. Gradual reforms, pilot programs, temporary frameworks, periodic reviews and adaptive regulation can balance stability with change. Crises may open opportunities for reform, but changes should be prepared in advance and remain subject to democratic safeguards.

Legitimacy ultimately depends on more than formally correct procedures. Citizens must be able to understand decisions, recognize who is responsible and experience meaningful opportunities for influence and appeal. Legitimacy is therefore a continuing relationship that must be maintained through transparency, participation, communication and visible correction.

Scale consistency requires two-way review[13]. Higher-level intervention should be reconsidered when coordination is no longer necessary, while local autonomy should be reconsidered when fragmented action produces rights violations, spillovers, or structural inequality. The burden of justification lies with the institution seeking to retain authority after the conditions supporting its allocation have changed.

Scale consistency is not a fixed institutional endpoint because the appropriate scale of governance changes as problems evolve. It is a permanent process of reassessing mandates, coordinating institutions and adjusting authority. A robust democratic order neither centralizes all power nor leaves every matter to local autonomy. It organizes decision-making flexibly at the level where problems can be addressed effectively, while preserving rights, democratic accountability and public participation throughout the system. This continuing alignment between problems, powers and democratic control is essential to institutional correctability in an increasingly interdependent world.

Would you like to explore how a relational understanding of humanity can transform democracy, law, the economy, and public institutions? Click the link below to read the full book, Becoming Human Together, and discover a new framework for building a more humane, democratic, and correctable society within ecological limits.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/413458836_Becoming_Human_Together_Rethinking_Democracy_Power_and_Institutions_for_a_Complex_and_Changing_World

---

[1] Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance,’ American Political Science Review 97, no. 2 (2003): 233–243, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055403000649.

[2] Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Michael Zürn, A Theory of Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[3] Treaty on European Union, art. 5 and Protocol No. 2; Andreas Føllesdal, ‘Survey Article: Subsidiarity,’ Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 2 (1998): 190–218.

[4] Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States,’ American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (2010): 641–672; Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, ‘The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas,’ American Political Science Review 55, no. 4 (1961): 831–842.

[5] Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism,’ International Organization 63, no. 1 (2009): 1–31, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090018.

[6] Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[7] Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, ‘Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice,’ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, no. 4 (2008): 543–571, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[8] Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos, eds., Governance and Democratic Legitimacy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability,’ European Law Journal 13, no. 4 (2007): 447–468.

[9] Jan Kooiman, Governing as Governance (London: Sage, 2003); Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[10] Venice Commission, Respect for Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law during States of Emergency, CDL-AD(2020)014; Ranchordás, Constitutional Sunsets and Experimental Legislation.

[11] Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); UNDP, Human Development Report 2023/2024 (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2024).

[12] OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en; James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[13] Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity’; Hooghe and Marks, ‘Unraveling the Central State.